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Abstract. We consider Tullock’s contests with reimbursements. It turns
out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes the net total spending while
the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes the net total spending. We investigate
properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with the classic
Tullock’s contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections
are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Contest literature has greatly expanded since Tullock (1980) presented his simple
yet powerful rent-seeking model.1 However, the contest literature is almost silent
about contests with reimbursements. Kaplan et al. (2002) provide two examples of
contests with reimbursements in politics and economics. In politics, in the primary
election, candidates raise and spend money to be the party’s choice for the general
election.2 All losers pay the costs and are not able to advance, while the winner
advances to the general election and receives increased funding to compete in this
election. In this sense, the winner in the primary wins the prize of the primary
election and is monetarily reimbursed the cost of the primary election, so she can
be competitive in the general election. The second example, Kaplan et al. (2002)
provide, is jet contracts. Boeing and Lockheed Martin were competing for a Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) contract. In order to win the bid for the government contract,
they had to design a prototype to test in ﬂight. Under the rules of this type of
∗We are grateful to Ross Baird, Whitney Haring-Smith, Chris Rosson, and Karl W¨ arneryd for
helpful comments.
1See surveys by Nitzan (1994), Szymanski (2003), and Konrad (2007).
2Here we consider US Presidential elections as there have been cases where a candi-
date for the US Senate or the US House has lost a primary and went on to compete and
win in the general election (for example, see Lieberman’s senatorial victory in Connecticut,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2006/CT/CT.htm?csp=34)
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contest, both companies built this prototype up-front to win this JSF government
contract. This contract would enable the winning company to make more JSFs for
the government purchase. Thus, the government gives both the prize, the contract,
to the winner and reimburses the winner their costs of entry through the purchase of
the later completed jets. Moreover, the JSF contract was also a loser-reimbursement
mechanism because both Boeing and Lockheed Martin were given a total of 2.2 billion
USD to demonstrate their concepts for the ﬁnal competition.3 Another example of a
reimbursement is Californian JSF Income Tax Credit which is given to any industry
in the area which has won subcontracts to construct parts for the JSF.4 This tax
credit is a winner-reimbursement mechanism.
In this paper we consider n-player Tullock contests where the winner and the
losers can be reimbursed. We are interested to know how diﬀerent reimbursement
schemes aﬀect the (net) total spending. First, we ﬁnd the reimbursement schemes
which maximize the net total spending. It turns out that there is a continuum of
such designer-optimal reimbursement schemes. In all of them, the winner has to be
completely reimbursed for her eﬀort. The easiest mechanism to implement and the
one with the lowest total spending is the reimbursement scheme where only the winner
gets her eﬀort reimbursed. In fact, this is probably one of the most popular contest
designs in real life. Then, we ﬁnd a unique reimbursement scheme which minimizes
the net total spending. All losers have to be reimbursed in this case. Therefore, the
winner-reimbursed and loser-reimbursed contests deﬁne the boundaries for the net
total spending in all contests with reimbursements.
We consider properties of the winner-reimbursed and the loser-reimbursed contests
in Sections 3 and 4. First, we describe the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in both cases, xW (V,n,r)a n dxL (V,n,r). The equilibrium eﬀort depends
on the prize value, V , the number of players, n, and the marginal return, r.I n
both winner-reimbursed and loser-reimbursed contests, we demonstrate the standard
results that (1) the individual eﬀort, the expected individual payoﬀ, and the (net)
total eﬀort are increasing functions of the prize value, V , and (2) the individual
eﬀort and the (net) total eﬀort are increasing functions of the parameter r, while the
expected individual payoﬀ i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h ep a r a m e t e rr.
We discover surprising properties in both contests if the number of players in-
creases. In particular, the total eﬀort is a decreasing function of the number of
players in the winner-reimbursed contest, and the individual eﬀort is an increasing
function of the number of players in the loser-reimbursed contest. Note that the
3See an unclassiﬁed military document on
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2000/Navy/0603800N.pdf, page 6.
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winner gets the value of the prize, V , and is compensated for her eﬀort, xW (V,n,r),
in the winner-reimbursed contest. If the number of players increases, the chance to
win the contest decreases and each player decreases her spending (like in the Tul-
lock’s contest). However, the individual spending reduction is so strong (players are
spending more than they did without reimbursements) that this eﬀect prevails on the
aggregate: the net total spending, level (unlike the Tullock’s case). The situation is
opposite in the loser-reimbursed contest. Each player pays only if she wins (she is
reimbursed otherwise). Therefore, if the number of player increases, the chance to
win the contest decreases and each player increases her spending in order to improve
this chance.
Our previous observation leads to the following intriguing consequences. Even
though the net total spending is higher in the winner-reimbursement contest, the
total spending can be higher in the loser-reimbursement contest as Example 1 shows.
Therefore, the loser-reimbursed contests deserve serious attention in R&D because
they stimulate high total spending which might be one of the designer’s goals. This
may explain why the government continues to fund universities despite the fact that
private industry receives a signiﬁcantly larger amount of patents than universities.
We are aware of two papers where the authors consider a particular type of contests
with reimbursements: a lottery (r = 1) where the winner gets her eﬀort reimbursed.
Cohen and Sela (2005) show that in a two-player case there exists a unique internal
equilibrium where the weak contestant wins with higher probability than the stronger
one. Matros (2008) analyzes n-player case. He ﬁnds all equilibria in pure strategies
and discusses their properties.
The idea to include reimbursement possibilities into a mechanism is not new. It
has already been used in the auction literature. Riley and Samuelson (1981) intro-
duced Sad Loser Auction - a two-player all-pay auction where the winner (the highest
bidder) gets her bid back and wins the prize. Recently, Goeree and Oﬀerman (2004)
analyze Amsterdam auction in which the highest losing bidder obtains a premium
which depends on her own bid. It is important to note that Sad Loser or Amsterdam
auctions cannot produce more expected revenue than the optimal auction. At the
same time, the winner-reimbursed contest provides the highest expected net total
eﬀort, but the Tullock’s contest does not.
Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (2005) is an important complement to our paper.
These authors use an all-pay auction framework in order to compare diﬀerent liti-
gation systems. There are three main diﬀerences between our models. First, they
consider a game with incomplete information: their players have private values. Sec-
ond, they examine an all-pay auction instead of a contest. Finally, the reimbursements
are made by players in their model.
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form of contests with reimbursements. The designer-optimal contest is analyzed in
Sections 3. We consider the contest which minimizes the net total spending in Section
4. Discussion and extensions are in Section 5.
2. n-Player Contest
We consider an n-player Tullock’s contest with one prize, V , where the contest de-
signer can reimburse players’ contributions. We assume that the winner/loser re-
imbursements are additively separable in the winner and loser spending. Formally,




















L (xi) − xi, (1)




j ≥ 0, times
the contest prize, V , and the winner’s reimbursement, πW (xi); the second term is the








≥ 0, times the loser’s reimbursement,
πL (xi); and the last term is the cost of eﬀort.5 In order to ﬁnd the closed-form
solution we look at linear reimbursement functions.6 We assume that the individual





0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, α + γ < 2. (3)
Assumption (3) guarantees that the individual reimbursement does not exceed indi-
vidual eﬀort and the total reimbursement is strictly less than the total eﬀort.
















(α − γ)+γ − 1=0 . (4)
The second order condition is
(r − 1)[V +( α − γ)xi]+2( α − γ)xi+
5We assume that if x1 = ... = xn = 0, then nobody wins the prize.






´ [V +( α − γ)xi] ≤ 0. (5)





n2 − (n +( n − 1)r)α − (n − 1)(n − r)γ
V. (6)
The second order condition (5) at the symmetric equilibrium becomes
r ≤ n
n − α − γ + nγ
4γ − 2n + nα − 5nγ + n2γ + n2. (7)
Expression (6) gives the individual equilibrium spending for contests with reim-

















n − α − (n − 1)γ
(n − 1)(1 − γ)
. (8)
Conditions (8) and (7) describe the range of parameter r for contests with reim-
bursements. Note that in the Tullock’s contest, α = γ = 0, conditions (8) and (7)
boil down to the standard expression r ≤ n/(n − 1).
2.1. (Net) Total Spending. Deﬁne the total equilibrium spending
TS= nx
∗





∗) − (n − 1)π
L (x
∗).
Note that, ﬁrst, the players spend TS, then the winner is determined and she and
losers are reimbursed. Finally, the contest designer receives NT. It is important to
emphasize that the reimbursement scheme is a key diﬀerence between our model and
that of Baye, et. al. (2005). In their model, the players reimburse the costs of the
winner (or loser). In our case, the contest designer reimburses the players’ costs.Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 6
We want to analyze the impact of reimbursements on the (net) total spending.
Typically, a contest designer either wants to maximize the net total spending (the
optimal contest), minimize the net total spending (minimize the rent dissipation),
or maximize the total spending (if the designer’s goal is the intensity of research,
f o re x a m p l ei nR & Dc o n t e s t s ) . I ti se a s yt os e ei n( 6 )t h a tt h et o t a ls p e n d i n gi s
increasing in both reimbursement parameters α and γ. Therefore, the original Tul-
lock’s contest, α = γ =0 ,g i v e sthe lowest total spending. Obviously, if players are
completely reimbursed whether they win or lose, α = γ = 1, players will want to
spend without any bounds. Since we have condition (3), this contest is not included
in our consideration. However, by continuity, for any T0 ∈ R, T0 < +∞ it is always
possible to ﬁnd a reimbursement scheme such that α+γ < 2a n dTS>T 0.N o w ,w e
consider the net total spending.
First, we ﬁnd all reimbursement schemes
¡
πW,πL¢
which maximize the net total
spending,
NT
Max =m a x
πW,πL NT =m a x
α,γ (n − α − (n − 1)γ)x
∗. (9)
Then, we consider all reimbursement schemes
¡
πW,πL¢
which minimize the net total
spending,
NT
Min =m i n
πW,πL NT =m i n
α,γ (n − α − (n − 1)γ)x
∗. (10)
2.2. Optimal Reimbursement. In this section, we ﬁnd reimbursement schemes
which maximize the net total spending, the optimal reimbursement scheme from the
designer point of view.
Note that using (6), (9) can be rewritten as
NT
Max =m a x
α,γ (n − 1)rV
n − α − (n − 1)γ
n2 − ((1 + r)n − r)α − (n − 1)(n − r)γ
. (11)
The ﬁrst order condition for variable α is
∂ (NT)
∂α
=( n − 1)rV×
−[n2 − ((1 + r)n − r)α − (n − 1)(n − r)γ] + ((1 + r)n − r)[n − α − (n − 1)γ]
[n2 − ((1 + r)n − r)α − (n − 1)(n − r)γ]
2 .




2 − ((1 + r)n − r)α − (n − 1)(n − r)γ
¤
+ ((1 + r)n − r)[n − α − (n − 1)γ]=Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 7
r(n − 1)n(1 − γ) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the net total spending increases monotonically in α,
∂ (NT)
∂α
> 0( 1 2 )
and the optimal α is
α =1 .
It means that in any optimal reimbursement scheme the contest designer should
always return the winner’s spending. Intuitively, if the winner gets reimbursed, it
increases the actual prize and as a result it increases the competition in the contest
and the net total spending (designer’s revenue).
Note that conditions (8) and (7) become r ≤ 1. In the symmetric equilibrium,
when the winner gets her eﬀort reimbursed, α =1a n d0≤ γ < 1,7 the equilibrium




















So, at the optimal α = 1, the net total spending is independent from the loser reim-
bursement. Hence we have the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that 0 <r≤ 1. Then, there is a continuum of optimal
reimbursement schemes. They can be described by
α =1and 0 ≤ γ < 1.
The individual and total spending are monotonically increasing in γ. The equilibrium
individual spending, the total spending, and the net total spending are described in
(13), (14),a n d(15).
Since there is a continuum of the optimal reimbursement schemes, we will consider
the scheme with the lowest total spending in the next section, γ =0 .T h i ss c h e m ei s
the easiest one to implement: only the winner gets her eﬀort reimbursed.
7γ < 1 because condition (3) must hold.Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 8
2.3. Minimal Net Total Spending. In this section, we ﬁnd a reimbursement
scheme which minimizes the net total spending.
Note that condition (12) ensures that it must be
α =0 ( 1 6 )
in order to minimize the net total spending. Therefore, the minimization problem
(10) with condition (16) can be rewritten as
NT
Min =m i n
γ NT =( n − 1)rV
n − (n − 1)γ
n2 − (n − 1)(n − r)γ
.
The ﬁrst order condition is
∂ (NT)
∂γ
=( n − 1)
2 rV
−(n2 − (n − 1)(n − r)γ)+( n − r)(n − (n − 1)γ)






2 − (n − 1)(n − r)γ
¢
+( n − r)(n − (n − 1)γ)=
−n





for any γ ∈ [0,1]. Note that conditions (8) and (7) for α =0a n dγ = 1 become
0 <r≤ n
2n − 1
2n2 − 7n +4
. (17)
H e n c ew eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 2. Suppose that condition (17) holds. Then, there exists a unique
reimbursement scheme which minimizes the net total spending. This reimbursement
scheme requires that each loser gets her spending back, or
α =0and γ =1 .




(n − 1)r + n
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Even though the loser-reimbursement scheme provides incentives to spend more
(positive eﬀect: ex-ante losers’ insurance), because a loser gets her money back, the
net total spending is equal to the winning spending only (negative eﬀect: only one
contributor). As Proposition 2 shows, the negative eﬀect on the net total spending
is always stronger.
Propositions 1 and 2 also demonstrate that the net total spending in a contest











2.4. Summary. Figure 1 summarizes our ﬁndings for this section in a contour
map of the net total spending, NT, as a function of α and γ. Note that the classic
Tullock’s (1980) model corresponds to the case α = γ =0 .Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 10
Figure 1 shows that there exists a unique reimbursement scheme (α =0 ,γ =1 )
which minimizes the net total spending. From this point, the net total spending
increases along γ-line (α =0 ,γ < 1), the loser gets back less and less, until α = γ =0 ,
Tullock’s model. Finally, the net total spending increases along α-line (α > 0, γ =0 )
until its maximum is reached at α =1 ,γ = 0 (winner-reimbursed contest).
As we note above, the total spending is increasing in both parameters, α and
γ. Therefore, the total spending is increasing from the left bottom corner (Tullock’s
contest) to the right up corner in Figure 1.
3. Winner gets her effort reimbursed
Suppose that α =1a n dγ = 0. Then in the symmetric equilibrium, from (6), each
























Hence, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that 0 <r≤ 1 and n ≥ 2, then the winner-reimbursed
contest has a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium each player exerts
eﬀort (18) and obtains the expected payoﬀ (19).
In the lottery case, r = 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that r =1and n ≥ 2, then the winner-reimbursed contest has







and obtains zero expected payoﬀ. The net total spending is NTMax = V .
We will talk about properties of the symmetric equilibrium in the next subsection.Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 11













The following propositions describe how the (net) total spending changes if the
number of players, the prize value, or the parameter r vary.
Proposition 4. In the symmetric equilibrium the individual eﬀort, xW, the expected
individual payoﬀ, πW, and the total spending, TSW, are decreasing functions of the
number of players; the net total spending, NTMax,i sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h e
number of players.






























It is a standard result in the contest literature that the individual spending de-
creases and the total spending increases as the number of players increases. Proposi-
tion 4 shows not only the standard contest result that the expected individual payoﬀ
and individual eﬀort decrease as the number of players increase, but also an intrigu-
ing observation that the total spending decreases as the number of players increases.
If the winner gets reimbursed, players become very aggressive and exert much more
eﬀort than they do in the standard Tullock’s contest without reimbursements. In this
sense the winner-reimbursed contest becomes very risky: a player can win a higher
prize, but she can also lose more now. When the number of players increases, the
total spending is aﬀected in two ways. Each player spends (much) less now, but there
a r em o r ep l a y e r s .I tt u r n so u tt h a ti nt h ew i n n e r - r e i m b u r s e dc o n t e s tt h eﬁrst eﬀect
is stronger. It is important to emphasize that the second eﬀect is stronger in the
contest without reimbursements. Therefore, we getTullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 12







The following proposition describes how parameter r inﬂuences the winner-reimbursed
contest.
Proposition 5. Suppose that 0 <r≤ 1 and n ≥ 2,t h e ni nt h es y m m e t r i ce q u i -
librium the individual eﬀort, and the (net) total spending are increasing functions
of the parameter r. The expected individual payoﬀ is a decreasing function of the
parameter r.






























Proposition 5 demonstrates that if parameter r increases, then the individual
eﬀort increases too, because the probability of success can be inﬂuenced more now.
However, as a result, the expected individual payoﬀ decreases, because each player
is spending more, but has the same chance to win now. Since players are spending
more, the contest designer will also receive more, hence, the increase in the net total
spending.
It is clear that when someone values something more, she is ready to spend more
and expect higher payoﬀ. This is the reason for the following results.
Proposition 6. Suppose that 0 <r≤ 1 and n ≥ 2, then in the symmetric equilib-
rium the individual eﬀort, the expected individual payoﬀ, and the (net) total spending
are increasing functions of the prize value, V .
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End of proof.






because of the assumption (8). However, the total spending can exceed the prize






It is intriguing that the winner-reimbursed contest induces wasteful spending. This
observation highlights the fact that contest are ineﬃcient in general.





rV ≤ rV ≤ V.
Hence we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7. Suppose that 0 <r≤ 1 and n ≥ 2. Then, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the highest net total spending is achieved if r =1 .
4. Losers get their effort reimbursed
Suppose that α =0a n dγ = 1. Then in the symmetric equilibrium, from (6), each




n +( n − 1)r
rV. (20)




n +( n − 1)r
V ≥ 0. (21)





n +( n − 1)r
rV
and the net total spending is
NT
Min = TS




(n − 1)r + n
V.
Hence, we obtain the following proposition.Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 14
Proposition 8. Suppose that condition (17) holds and n ≥ 2.T h e n t h e l o s e r -
reimbursed contest has a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium each
player exerts eﬀort (20) and obtains expected payoﬀ (21).
In the lottery case, r = 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Suppose that r =1and n ≥ 3, then the loser-reimbursed contest has




















We will discuss properties of the symmetric equilibrium in the next subsection.
4.1. Properties of the symmetric equilibrium. The following propositions
describe how the (net) total spending changes if the number of players, the prize
value, or the parameter r vary.
Proposition 9. In the symmetric equilibrium the individual eﬀort and the (net) to-
tal spending are increasing functions of the number of players; the expected individual
payoﬀ is a decreasing function of the number of players.























n2 + r(n − 1)
2
(n +( n − 1)r)
2rV > 0.
End of proof.
It is a standard result in the contest literature that the individual spending de-
creases as the number of players increases. However, Proposition 9 shows that the in-
dividual spending increases as the number of players increases in the loser-reimbursedTullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 15
contest. If all losers get reimbursed, it means that each player has an ex-ante insur-
ance: only the winner has to pay ex-post. As a result players become very aggressive
(they try to increase their winning chances). If the number of players increases, play-
ers spend more in order to keep their winning chances (they try to compensate the
decrease in their winning probability).
The following example illustrates that the total spending can be higher in the
loser-reimbursed contest than in the winner-reimbursed contest.
Example 1. Suppose that r =1 ,n=5 , and V =1 .T h e n
TS









If the contest is an R&D competition, the designer might care about not only the
net total spending, but also the total spending (to increase the rate of innovations).
Then, the loser-reimbursed contest might be a choice to consider. This may explain
why the government continues to fund universities despite the fact that private in-
dustry receives a signiﬁcantly larger amount of patents.
Proposition 10. Suppose that condition (17) holds and n ≥ 2,t h e ni nt h es y m -
metric equilibrium the individual eﬀort and the (net) total spending are increasing
functions of the parameter r; the expected individual payoﬀ is a decreasing function
of the parameter r.























n2 (n − 1)
(n +( n − 1)r)
2V> 0.
End of proof.
Proposition 10 demonstrates that the net total spending cannot be higher than






Our ﬁnal result in this section is standard. It shows that the individual eﬀort, the
expected individual payoﬀ, and the (net) total spending are monotonic in the prize
value.Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements 16
Proposition 11. Suppose that condition (17) holds and n ≥ 2,t h e ni nt h es y m -
metric equilibrium the individual eﬀort, the expected individual payoﬀ, and the (net)
total spending are increasing functions of the prize value, V .




























In this paper contests with reimbursements are considered. First, a unique symmetric
equilibrium in such contests is found. Then, we describe reimbursement schemes
which maximize and minimize the net total spending. It turns out that there is a
continuum of schemes which are optimal from the contest designer’s point of view.
We describe all of them and discuss, in detail, properties of one of them: the winner-
reimbursed contest. This is the optimal reimbursement scheme with the minimal
total spending. It turns out that there exists a unique reimbursement scheme which
minimizes the net total spending. Losers get their eﬀort reimbursed in this scheme.
Our results have several applications. First, the winner-reimbursed design can
be used in charities and casinos in order to increase the net total spending. Second,
the loser-reimbursed design can be used in R&D in order to stimulate participants.
Moreover, the total spending can be higher in the loser-reimbursed contest than in the
winner-reimbursed contest. It might also be one of the designer’s goals: to increase
the rate of innovations in the contest.
Our work has many extensions. Further study would test our theory in the ex-
perimental laboratory. Another avenue for exploration would be to consider contests
with reimbursements when the common value of the prize is unknown to players.
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